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Abstract: At present, the classic corporate finance theory is challenged by various behavioral visions of 
corporate leaders in the actual decision-making of corporate finance. From the perspective of behavioral finance, 
this paper selects the data of A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in 2003-2016 to study the relationship between CEO's overconfidence and business operations. The 
study found that: Overconfidence CEOs will tend to increase the level of leverage, increase the number of loans, 
especially to increase the number of short-term loans; When the economic growth is faster, the listed company's 
CEO is more inclined to overconfidence; However, unlike the results of foreign studies, overconfident 
companies did not replace CEOs more frequently than non-overconfident companies, and did not increase the 
probability of bankruptcy. Finally, the CEO of a state-owned company does not appear to be more 
overconfident than the CEO of a private company. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large number of studies have shown that CEO's overconfidence has a major impact on the company's 
investment and financing decisions, company performance, and future development direction. Does an 
overconfident CEO have any advantages or disadvantages for company development? Since ROLL introduced 
this concept of overconfidence into the field of management for the first time in 1986, it has inspired scholars' 
enthusiasm. Early studies consistently agreed that managers generally have overconfidence, and overconfidence 
managers are prone to decision-making biases, which in turn threaten the healthy development of the company. 
Overconfident managers tend to conduct M&A activities that reduce the value of the company and tend to 
overinvest or underinvest. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to study how CEO's overconfidence will affect 
the company. This article draws lessons from the research results of domestic and foreign scholars, using actual 
data to examine the relationship between CEO overconfidence and investment behavior and its impact on 
business performance. 
 
2. Review of literature 
 
To study the issues mentioned in this article, we must first pay attention to what factors will affect the CEO's 
overconfidence. Rao Yulei and Jia Wenjing [1] found that CEOs with long tenure tend to be overconfident; 
CEOs of listed companies with high risks in the industry are prone to overconfidence; and CEOs of companies 
with higher debt ratios tend to show overconfidence. The personal characteristics of the CEO have no influence 
on the level of overconfidence of the CEO, thus indicating that personal characteristics such as age, education 
level, and education level are not factors that influence the overconfidence of the CEO. 
From the point of view of the CEO's overconfidence and corporate investment, the studies of Heaton [2] 
showed that the overconfidence of the company's senior executives will cause the company's profitability to 
decline. Malmendier and Tate [3] found that managers with overconfidence tend to make investment decisions 
based on the current state of the company’s cash flow, and that they are positively related to the degree of 
overconfidence due to the financial status of the company, especially for those investing. Investment decisions 
are often influenced by the financial status of the company. Tan Chang [4] believes that executive 
overconfidence is significantly positively correlated with expansionary investment, while expansionary 
investment is significantly negatively correlated with corporate performance. This indicates that expansionary 
investment will reduce company performance. 
From the point of view of CEO overconfidence and corporate finance, Landier and Thesmar [5] empirically 
tested the French listed companies in recent years and found that managers with overconfidence are more likely 
to choose to use short-term debt for financing. This is because overconfident managers tend to overestimate the 
company’s operating capabilities and the expected benefits of the project. At the same time, they think that they 
Journal of Modeling and Optimization
8
10:1 (2018)
 can well raise the funds needed for the operation of the company, that is, if necessary, they can quickly 
withdraw funds to repay debts. In addition, they will also underestimate the payback period of investment 
projects, and therefore tend to choose short-term liabilities. Wang Jing [6] found through research that the 
overconfidence of the general manager and the chairman of the board of directors tend to prolong the period of 
debt, and at the same time, when the company's internal cash flow is abundant, the overconfident managers 
prefer internal financing. 
 
3. Hypothesis of research 
 
Hypothesis 1. Overconfidence CEOs tend to increase the number of loans 
In general, an overconfident CEO will overestimate the future benefits of the investment project and 
underestimate the risk of the project. As a result, projects that inevitably result in a large number of negative 
NPV are also invested. Therefore, overconfident CEOs tend to increase the number of loans. 
Hypothesis 2. Overconfident CEOs tend to issue short-term loans instead of long-term loans 
First of all, overconfident CEOs often believe that their business capabilities are stronger than others, and 
overestimate the future earnings of investment projects, so they will be more inclined to choose short-term debt 
financing. Second, overconfident managers tend to think that they can well raise the funds needed for the 
operation of the company, that is, if necessary, they can quickly return funds to repay their debts. 
Hypothesis 3. Overconfidence firms tend to have higher leverage than non-overconfident firms 
The CEO's overconfidence has an impact on corporate finance policies. When overconfident CEOs 
overestimate the return on investment but cannot fully invest with their own capital, they need to borrow 
external funds and they are more willing to convert the debt into equity [7]. 
Hypothesis 4. The listed company CEO is more inclined to overconfidence when the economic growth is 
faster 
When the economic situation is very good, the company's financial situation is good and the company is 
operating normally. The CEO has reason to believe that his business ability is stronger than other companies, 
and overestimates the future earnings of investment projects, which makes them anticipate the profitability of 
future projects is good. The CEO of a listed company will be more inclined to show overconfidence and show 
up by increasing its holdings of company stocks. 
 
4. Data processing 
 
4.1.Sources of data 
In order to test whether the above assumptions are true, this paper selects listed companies in Chinese 
A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as samples, and the research interval is 2003-2016. 
Taking into account the special nature of financial companies and financial data are quite different from other 
industries, this article excludes financial listed companies. However, unlike previous studies, this article retains 
ST listed companies and treats ST and ST* listed companies as dummy variables to examine whether there is a 
significant causal relationship between CEO’s overconfidence and company’s poor management. All the 
financial data and corporate governance data of the sample company are from CSMAR series research database. 
The Shanghai A- share index is derived from Wind database. 
 
4.2.Measurement of overconfidence 
This article uses two methods to measure the CEO's overconfidence. The first method is that if the CEO has 
never reduced the stock of the company during his tenure, that is to say, the number of shares of the CEO is 
unchanged or increased, then we define this type of CEO as overconfidence. The second method is that we add a 
restriction condition based on method one. If the company’s stock price growth rate is smaller than the growth 
rate of the broader market, the CEO holds the company’s stock or stays the same, then thinks that the CEO has 
overconfidence. The following conditions are satisfied:  
①Holdi_Holdi-1≥0 
②Pricei/Pricei-1< Indexi/Indexi-1 
If these two conditions are established at the same time, it is considered that the company’s CEO is 
overconfident. Among them, Holdi is the number of shares of the company held by the CEO at the end of year i, 
Pricei is the closing price of the company's shares at the end of year i, and Indexi is the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange A-Share Index at the end of year i. 
 
4.3.Sources and definitions of variables 
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 Table 1 Sources and definitions of variables 
Variable type variable name Variable source 
Explained variable 
Short CSMAR database 
T_loans CSMAR database 
C_L_loans CSMAR database 
leverage CSMAR database 
Market_leverage CSMAR database 
Book_leverage CSMAR database 
Explanatory variables 
T_assets CSMAR database 
Book_leverage CSMAR database 
ROA CSMAR database 
Debt_assets_ratio CSMAR database 
virtual variable 
OC1 CSMAR database 
OC2 CSMAR database 
TURNOVER CSMAR database 
ST CSMAR database 
Control CSMAR database 
OC_GDP CSMAR database 
 
5. Analysis of measurement results 
 
5.1.Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Short 19926 0.260 0.220 0.0500 0.230 0.410 
T loans 19928 3.800e+09 1.600e+10 3.500e+08 9.000e+08 2.400e+09 
C L loans 17019 0.0100 0.0200 0 0.0100 0.0100 
leverage 19926 3.430 6.160 1.600 2.170 3.400 
Market lev~e 19926 0.430 6.430 0.380 0.540 0.710 
Book lever~e 19928 8.350 6.650 4.470 6.750 10.14 
T assets 19928 6.400e+09 2.200e+10 1.100e+09 2.100e+09 4.700e+09 
ROA 19925 -0.0400 16.14 0.0100 0.0300 0.0600 
Debt asset~o 19926 0.570 6.430 0.290 0.460 0.620 
OC1 20024 0.330 0.470 0 0 1 
OC2 20024 0.360 0.480 0 0 1 
TURNOVER 20024 0.0600 0.240 0 0 0 
ST 20024 0.0400 0.200 0 0 0 
Control 20024 0.500 0.500 0 0 1 
OC GDP 19928 0.400 0.490 0 0 1 
 
5.2.The effect of CEO overconfidence on corporate loans and leverage 
The first econometric model was designed to measure the effect of CEO overconfidence on corporate lending 
and leverage. We use multiple regression models for analysis to explain the influence of overconfidence of 
CEOs of Chinese A-share listed companies on business operations. We have designed an econometric model as 
follows: 
Annual_Rate =α+β1OC+ β2Z +Vi+µt+ϵ                                        (1) 
In this formula, the dependent variable Annual_Rate represents six independent variables, namely, the 
company's short-term loan rate, total loans, change rate of total loans, leverage, book leverage, and market 
leverage; OC is a dummy variable. If the business is overconfident, OC equals 1, otherwise zero. Z is the 
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 characteristics of the company's assets, including total assets, book leverage, return on assets, asset-liability ratio, 
and fixed effects representing the bank and the year respectively, representing random errors. 
The regression analysis of CEO's overconfidence and corporate loan relationship is as follows: 
Table 3 CEO's overconfidence and corporate loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Short_loans Short_loans C_loans C_loans T_loans 
OC1 0.0114***  0.00277***  436690619.3** 
 (2.75)  (6.29)  (2.05) 
OC2  0.0259***  0.00292***  
  (5.98)  (6.84)  
_cons 0.251*** 0.246*** 0.00776*** 0.00755*** 3.64627e+09*** 
 (146.55) (129.59) (29.72) (27.91) (41.36) 
N 19926 19926 17019 17019 19928 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively 
 
Table 4 CEO's overconfidence and corporate loans 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Short_loans Short_loans C_loans C_loans T_loans 
OC1 0.0120***  0.00243***  330549790.3* 
 (2.91)  (5.57)  (1.66) 
T_assets -4.13e-13*** -4.20e-13*** -4.50e-14*** -4.36e-14***  
 (-3.45) (-3.51) (-4.44) (-4.32)  
Book_lever -0.00170*** -0.00165*** 0.000576*** 0.000580*** 635024902.5*** 
 (-6.11) (-5.93) (18.00) (18.21) (51.08) 
ROA -0.000297** -0.000299** -0.0000796*** -0.0000786*** 6917251.2 
 (-2.08) (-2.09) (-3.73) (-3.69) (1.01) 
Debt_assets -0.000294 -0.000299 -0.000233*** -0.000230*** 21149927.6 
 (-0.81) (-0.82) (-4.33) (-4.28) (1.21) 
OC2  0.0254***  0.00287***  
  (5.89)  (6.79)  
_cons 0.268*** 0.263*** 0.00354*** 0.00319*** -1.63367e+09*** 
 (97.27) (90.20) (9.83) (8.61) (-12.34) 
N 19924 19924 17017 17017 19925 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively 
The main results are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. For each dependent variable, we measure the CEO's 
overconfidence effect from two aspects. The first aspect includes only the CEO's overconfidence variables, and 
the second aspect adds control over the bank's characteristics. In order to save space, we do not report the year 
dummy variable in the analysis. In all models, our regression includes all available non-financial listed 
companies' available data. 
By comparing the two overconfidence variables OC1 and OC2, it is not difficult to find that OC2 has a larger 
t value than OC1, which indicates that the second defined overconfidence variable has a more significant 
regression result. This is theoretically in line with expectations, because the second definition of overconfidence 
is to add a constraint under the first definition. It must be met if the CEO’s stock returns are lower than the 
market returns. Reduce the company's stock condition. This also shows on one side that it is more valuable to 
use OC2 to define overconfidence and that the defined overconfidence CEO is more targeted. 
To further study our hypothesis, we used different types of leverage as the dependent variables to study the 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and corporate leverage. The results of the regression are shown in 
Table 3. 
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 Table 5 CEO's overconfidence and corporate leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market_leverage Market_leverage Book_leverage Book_leverage leverage leverage 
OC2 0.235** -0.000215   0.739*** 0.744*** 
 (2.48) (-0.61)   (6.37) (6.47) 
T_assets  7.49e-17  1.27e-10***  -9.38e-12*** 
  (0.01)  (50.14)  (-3.56) 
Book_lever  -0.0000222    -0.0526*** 
  (-0.82)    (-6.55) 
ROA  -0.0000114  -0.00426  -0.0157*** 
  (-0.54)  (-1.09)  (-3.16) 
Debt_assets  -1.000***  -0.0162  -0.0474*** 
  (-18883.69)  (-1.63)  (-3.76) 
OC1   0.293* 0.229**   
   (2.64) (2.18)   
_cons 0.348*** 1.000*** 8.375*** 7.632*** 3.518*** 4.035*** 
 (6.09) (3294.97) (66.20) (61.52) (40.03) (37.32) 
N 19926 19925 19928 19925 19926 19924 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, Respectively 
We found that the coefficient of OC in model 2 is negative, and the absolute value of the coefficient is very 
small and not significant. We can think that this is because the influence of other factors on market leverage has 
weakened the influence of OC. In addition to model 2, it can be seen that the coefficient of OC is always 
significantly positive regardless of the type of leverage used, and is statistically significant at 5% or better. For 
example, a coefficient of 0.235 for Model 1 suggests that the average annual market leverage rate of 
overconfidence firms is 23.5% higher than that of non-overconfident firms, which is statistically significant and 
provides sufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 3. (Overconfident companies often have higher leverage than 
non-overconfident companies.) 
 
5.3. Endogenousissues 
The impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate lending and leverage may lead to endogenous problems. 
Therefore, in Table 6, we use a 2SLS corporate regression model to determine whether the regression results are 
endogenously robust. 
For such a 2SLS regression analysis, the most important thing is to find a good external tool variable. This 
variable is economically related to the overconfidence of the CEO, but it is not related to the error items related 
to the loans and leverage regression of the silver enterprise. 
To find such a tool, we considered a variable that has been shown in the literature on overconfidence as a 
determinant of CEO overconfidence: CEO's age. 
Bruin, Parker and Fischhoff [8] believe that the relationship between age and overconfidence is significant. 
In senior jobs such as the company’s CEO position, they believe that older people tend to be more overconfident 
than young people. Similarly, Crawford and Stankov [9] also found that older people showed greater 
overconfidence than young people. Therefore, we believe that the CEO's age is positively related to the CEO's 
overconfidence. We also have no reason to believe that the instrument has a direct economic impact on 
corporate loans and leverage, so it is unlikely that the instrument will be related to the error term in the second 
phase of the regression. 
In the 2SLS model, we see the OC as an endogenous variable that interacts with CEO age in the first stage. 
Stage 1: Regressing instrument variables and other exogenous variables of the model to OC 
P(OC| CEO Age, Z )= L ( δ1 + δ2 CEO Ag e + θZ+ Vi+µt )                          (2) 
Stage 2: In the main regression equation, use OC's fitting value OC3 instead 
Annual Rate = α+β1OC3+ β2Z +Vi+µt+ϵ                                         (3) 
In this formula, the dependent variable Annual_Rate represents six independent variables, which are the 
company's short-term loan rate, total loans, change rate of total loans, leverage, book leverage, and market 
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 leverage; OC is a dummy variable if the company is excessive Self-confident, OC is equal to 1, otherwise it is 
zero, OC3 is the predicted value of OC generated in the first stage regression, and CEO Age is the CEO's age. Z 
is the characteristics of the company's assets, including total assets, book leverage, return on assets, 
asset-liability ratio, and fixed effects representing the bank and the year respectively, representing random errors. 
The regression results are shown in Table 6, in parentheses based on robust standard errors for heteroskedastic 
adjustments [10]. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 6 Effect of CEO overconfidence on corporate loans and leverage under 2SLS model analysis 
 stage First  Second Second Second Second Second Second 
 OC2 C_L_loans leverage Book_leverage Market_leverage Short T_loans 
age 0.00438*** -0.000395**
* 
-0.0843*** -1.014*** -1.098*** -0.00125** -9385493.5 
 (8.37) (-6.01) (-5.16) (-91.10) (-17073.61) (-2.17) (-1.22) 
T_assets -6.49e-13*** 5.92e-15 3.62e-12 2.15e-10*** 1.63e-10*** -7.02e-13**
* 
0.713*** 
 (-3.93) (0.47) (1.19) (110.23) (13546.46) (-6.55) (495.27) 
Book_leve
r 
0.00157*** 0.000433*** -0.113***  -0.393*** -0.000759** 41407488.0*** 
 (2.90) (12.05) (-12.92)  (-11434.56) (-2.47) (10.04) 
ROA -0.00128*** -0.0000033 -0.000562 -0.0215*** 0.321*** -0.000142 178617.6 
 (-3.04) (-0.31) (-0.21) (-9.82) (30113.12) (-1.50) (0.14) 
Debt_asset
s 
-0.00399***       
 (-3.78)       
OC3  0.0630*** 20.43*** 236.9*** 250.6*** -0.0999 -5.93609e+09*
** 
  (4.73) (6.05) (109.58) (18875.73) (-0.84) (-3.73) 
_cons 0.149*** 0.000521 0.927 -31.04*** -36.36*** 0.362*** 1.47161e+09**
* 
 (5.92) (0.22) (1.58) (-73.86) (-15803.88) (17.60) (5.34) 
N 19901 16997 19900 19901 19901 19900 19901 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively 
As shown in the above table, the CEO's overconfidence is positively related to the year-on-year loan change 
rate (C_L_loans), corporate leverage, book leverage, and market leverage, and is highly significant. This also 
validates our hypothesis3 (overconfident companies often have higher leverage than non-overconfident 
companies). 
In Models 1 and 2 above, the coefficients on OC are positive and statistically significant. This confirms 
Hypothesis 1 (in non-crisis years, overconfident companies make more aggressive loan decisions than 
non-overconfident companies). For example, after controlling the characteristics of the firm, the coefficient of 
OC3 in model 2 is 0.0630, which indicates that during the crisis, the annual change rate of loans for 
overconfident companies was on average 6.3% higher than that of non-overconfident companies. 
To further test our hypothesis 2, Model 3-5 uses different types of leverage as dependent variables. 
Regardless of the type of leverage, the coefficient of OC is significantly positive and is statistically significant at 
5% or better. For example, in Model 3, the coefficient of OC indicates that overconfidence firms experienced an 
average of 20.43% leverage change rate over non-overconfident enterprises. This shows that overconfidence 
companies make more aggressive loan decisions than non-overconfident companies. In Model 4, OC's 
coefficient of 250.6 shows that overconfidence firms have an average annual market leverage of 250.6% higher 
than non-overconfident companies. This can provide evidence that overconfident companies tend to have higher 
leverage than non-overconfident companies. 
These results generally support our first two assumptions: Overconfidence firms are more aggressive than 
non-overconfident firms. Overconfidence companies also have more leverage than non-overconfident 
companies. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This article examines the relationship between CEO overconfidence and corporate investment financing 
behavior. The results show that: Overconfidence CEOs will tend to increase their level of leverage, increase the 
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 number of loans, especially to increase the number of short-term loans; when the economic growth is faster, the 
CEO of listed companies tends to be overconfident. But different from the results of foreign studies, the 
overconfident companies did not change CEOs more frequently than non-overconfident companies, nor did they 
increase the probability of bankruptcy. Finally, the CEOs of state-owned companies did not appear to be more 
overconfident than the CEOs of private enterprises. 
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